Hardware-Enabled Mechanisms for Verifying Responsible AI Development

Authors

  • Aidan O’Gara Oxford University; Longview Philanthropy
  • Gabriel RAND Corporation, Oregon State University
  • Will Hodgkins Center for AI Safety
  • James Petrie Future of Life Institute
  • Vincent Immler Oregon State University
  • Aydin Aysu North Carolina State University
  • Kanad Basu University of Texas at Dallas
  • Shivam Bhasin Nanyang Technological University
  • Stjepan Picek Radboud University
  • Ankur Srivastava University of Maryland

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.70777/si.v2i3.15157

Keywords:

training compute, ai governance, artificial general intelligence, hardware-enabled mechanisms, ai transparency, agi risk, ai risk

Abstract

Advancements in AI capabilities, driven in large part by scaling up computing resources used for AI training, have created opportunities to address major global challenges but also pose risks of misuse. Hardware-enabled mechanisms (HEMs) can support responsible AI development by enabling verifiable reporting of key properties of AI training activities such as quantity of compute used, training cluster configuration or location, as well as policy enforcement. Such tools can promote transparency and improve security, while addressing privacy and intellectual property concerns. Based on insights from an interdisciplinary workshop, we identify open questions regarding potential implementation approaches, emphasizing the need for further research to ensure robust, scalable solutions.

Author Biography

Aidan O’Gara, Oxford University; Longview Philanthropy

Aidan conducts grant investigations in artificial intelligence (AI), with a particular focus in technical research on AI safety. Before joining Longview, he conducted research on machine learning and AI policy at GovAI, Epoch, Cornell University, AI Impacts, and the Center for AI Safety. He also spent three years leading the data science team at a fintech startup. Alongside his work at Longview, Aidan is a DPhil candidate in AI at Oxford University.

 

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Historical chart of notable AI models vs. training compute

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Published

2025-07-20

How to Cite

O’Gara, A., Kulp, G., Hodgkins, W., Petrie, J., Immler, V., Aysu, A., … Srivastava, A. (2025). Hardware-Enabled Mechanisms for Verifying Responsible AI Development . SuperIntelligence - Robotics - Safety & Alignment, 2(3). https://doi.org/10.70777/si.v2i3.15157