Effective Mitigations for Systemic Risks from General-Purpose AI
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.70777/si.v2i1.13975Keywords:
agi risk mitigation, agi risks, artificial general intelligence risksAbstract
The systemic risks posed by general-purpose AI models are a growing concern, yet the effectiveness of mitigations remains underexplored. Previous research has proposed frameworks for risk mitigation, but has left gaps in our understanding of the perceived effectiveness of measures for mitigating systemic risks. Our study addresses this gap by evaluating how experts perceive different mitigations that aim to reduce the systemic risks of general-purpose AI models. We surveyed 76 experts whose expertise spans AI safety; critical infrastructure; democratic processes; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear risks (CBRN); and discrimination and bias. Among 27 mitigations identified through a literature review, we find that a broad range of risk mitigation measures are perceived as effective in reducing various systemic risks and technically feasible by domain experts. In particular, three mitigation measures stand out: safety incident reports and security information sharing, third-party pre-deployment model audits, and pre-deployment risk assessments. These measures show both the highest expert agreement ratings (>60%) across all four risk areas and are most frequently selected in experts’ preferred combinations of measures (>40%). The surveyed experts highlighted that external scrutiny, proactive evaluation and transparency are key principles for effective mitigation of systemic risks. We provide policy recommendations for implementing the most promising measures, incorporating the qualitative contributions from
The systemic risks posed by general-purpose AI models are a growing concern, yet the effectiveness of mitigations remains underexplored. Previous research has proposed frameworks for risk mitigation, but has left gaps in our understanding of the perceived effectiveness of measures for mitigating systemic risks. Our study addresses this gap by evaluating how experts perceive different mitigations that aim to reduce the systemic risks of general-purpose AI models. We surveyed 76 experts whose expertise spans AI safety; critical infrastructure; democratic processes; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear risks (CBRN); and discrimination and bias. Among 27 mitigations identified through a literature review, we find that a broad range of risk mitigation measures are perceived as effective in reducing various systemic risks and technically feasible by domain experts. In particular, three mitigation measures stand out: safety incident reports and security information sharing, third-party pre-deployment model audits, and pre-deployment risk assessments. These measures show both the highest expert agreement ratings (>60%) across all four risk areas and are most frequently selected in experts’ preferred combinations of measures (>40%). The surveyed experts highlighted that external scrutiny, proactive evaluation and transparency are key principles for effective mitigation of systemic risks. We provide policy recommendations for implementing the most promising measures, incorporating the qualitative contributions from
The systemic risks posed by general-purpose AI models are a growing concern, yet the effectiveness of mitigations remains underexplored. Previous research has proposed frameworks for risk mitigation, but has left gaps in our understanding of the perceived effectiveness of measures for mitigating systemic risks. Our study addresses this gap by evaluating how experts perceive different mitigations that aim to reduce the systemic risks of general-purpose AI models. We surveyed 76 experts whose expertise spans AI safety; critical infrastructure; democratic processes; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear risks (CBRN); and discrimination and bias. Among 27 mitigations identified through a literature review, we find that a broad range of risk mitigation measures are perceived as effective in reducing various systemic risks and technically feasible by domain experts. In particular, three mitigation measures stand out: safety incident reports and security information sharing, third-party pre-deployment model audits, and pre-deployment risk assessments. These measures show both the highest expert agreement ratings (>60%) across all four risk areas and are most frequently selected in experts’ preferred combinations of measures (>40%). The surveyed experts highlighted that external scrutiny, proactive evaluation and transparency are key principles for effective mitigation of systemic risks. We provide policy recommendations for implementing the most promising measures, incorporating the qualitative contributions from experts. These insights should inform regulatory frameworks and industry practices for mitigating the systemic risks associated with general-purpose AI.
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